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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few decades genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have 
become pervasive in agriculture.1 In 2013, 433.2 million acres were planted with 
genetically modified crops in twenty-seven countries.2 This figure has grown 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2016; B.S. 
Animal Science, University of California, Davis, 2011. I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor 
Stephen McCaffrey, for his help and guidance in developing this Comment. I would also like to thank my 
friends and family for their support throughout the writing process. 
1. Clive James, ISSA BRIEF NO. 49: GLOBAL STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED BIOTECH/GM CROPS: 2014 1 
(ISAAA 2014), available at http://isaaa.org/resources/publications/pocketk/16/default.asp (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
2. Id. at 2. 
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exponentially from just 4.3 million acres planted in 1996.3 Proponents of the 
spread of genetically modified (GM) crops argue that these crops—with their 
increased yield, resistance to pests and pesticides, and drought resistance—are 
the answer to world issues such as hunger and famine.4 Further, the future of 
transgenic5 crops likely includes using plants as production methods for 
pharmaceuticals and industrial compounds.6 However, others take a more 
cautious approach to GM crops; they warn that there are unknown risks posed to 
the environment, human health, and genetic diversity among our food crops.7 
Because of these concerns, many countries still treat GM crops with caution.8 
Notably, the European Union (EU) has applied the precautionary principle to the 
introduction of genetically modified products and crops into the market.9 This 
principle allows participating countries to stop the dissemination of GM products 
if there is a concern for the safety of the public or the environment.10 Countries 
may ban such products even if there is not enough data to allow a risk analysis 
and assessment with sufficient certainty.11 Europe is not alone in its cautionary 
approach; Mexico, while not as staunchly anti-GMO as the EU, has put a ban on 
the growth of genetically modified maize.12 This ban stems from a concern for the 
genetic diversity of corn in its birthplace and for the cultural implications of 
growing GM maize.13 Corn’s “agronomic and nutritive qualities and the 
mechanisms of reproduction . . . make maize populations especially diverse, 
 
3. Id. 
4. Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47, 47 (2001). 
5. ”Transgenic” refers to organisms that have had genetic material from other organisms of different 
species intentionally inserted into their genomes. Most GMOs are transgenic and I use the terms 
interchangeably here. 
6. Rebecca M. Bratspies, Consuming (F)ears of Corn: Public Health and Biopharming, 30 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 371, 371 (2004); Glynis Giddings et al., Transgenic Plants as Factories for Biopharmaceuticals, 18 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1151 (2000); Maria Gavilescu & Yusuf Christi, Biotechnology—A Sustainable 
Alternative for Chemical Industry, 23 BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVANCES 471 (2005). 
7. Murphy, supra note 4. 
8. Id.; Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products, WT/DS/291/R, WT/DS/292/R, WT/DS/293/R (Sept. 29, 2006), available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/news06_e/291r_e.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
9. COMM’N OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION ON THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 2 (2000), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri= 
CELEX:52000DC0001 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
10. Id. at 7. 
11. Id. The EU’s practice of allowing complete bans on genetically modified products goes far beyond 
what is allowed under the GATT-WTO Regime. In a dispute brought by the United States, Canada, and 
Argentina against the EU for its de facto moratorium on GM products, the WTO decided that such a 
moratorium was unacceptable because of the limits it put on free trade. Panel Report, supra note 8. 
12. Antonio Turrent & Jose Antonio Serratos, Context and Background on Maize and its Wild Relatives 
in Mexico, in MAIZE AND BIODIVERSITY: THE EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC MAIZE IN MEXICO 1 (2004); EDIT 
ANTAL ET AL., MAIZE AND BIOSECURITY IN MEXICO: DEBATE AND PRACTICE 17 (2007). 
13. Infra Part II. 
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dynamic, and susceptible to the unintended incorporation of genetically altered 
traits.”14 
One risk of genetically altered crops is the spread of altered genes to 
neighboring conventional crops or to different species.15 Plants reproduce through 
cross-pollination, and, depending on the species, pollen is carried from plant to 
plant and field to field, by birds, insects, and even wind.16 Corn, the focus of this 
Comment, disperses its pollen through wind transfer.17 Corn pollen can travel a 
half-mile in two minutes with fifteen miles-per-hour winds.18 Under the correct 
conditions this distance can increase dramatically. This means pollen from 
genetically altered corn grown in one field can pollinate neighboring farms and 
crops far away.19 This pollen drift presents a problem when GM crops are planted 
close to borders with other nations, like Mexico, that have bans on genetically 
modified crops.20 
This Comment looks into the implications of genetically modified pollen 
crossing borders and discusses the application of transboundary pollution law to 
such situations. Nations that allow the growth of transgenic crops may be liable 
for the spread of transgenes to the non-GMO crops of neighboring countries. 
These implications will be explored using the United States-Mexico border as a 
test case.21 Part II will focus on Mexico’s ban on GMO maize, its rationale, and 
the implications that allowing growth of GMO maize would have on Mexican 
society.22 Part III examines existing international law regulating and assigning 
liability for transnational pollution and how these laws and treaties might be 
applied to the spread of GM pollen across the United States-Mexico border.23 Part 
IV looks into what existing agencies in the United States might be best able to 
create policies to minimize or avoid liability that could arise from transboundary 
spread of genetically modified pollen.24 
 
14. Kathleen McAfee, Beyond Techno-Science: Transgenic Maize in the Fight over Mexico’s Future, 39 
GEOFORUM 148, 149 (2008). 
15. Turrent & Serratos, supra note 12. 
16. Jessica Lynd, Comment, Gone with the Wind: Why Even Utility Patents Cannot Fence in Self-
Replicating Technologies, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 663, 666 (2013). 
17. KENT BRITTAN, METHODS TO ENABLE THE COEXISTENCE OF DIVERSE CORN PRODUCTION SYSTEMS, 
AGRIC. BIOTECH. IN CAL. SERIES, PUBLICATION 8192 1 (2006). 
18. Id. at 2. 
19. ANTAL ET AL., supra note 12, at 59. 
20. See Corn Production, TEX. CORN PRODUCERS (last visited Oct. 12, 2014), http://texascorn.org/learn-
more/corn-production/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (indicating counties along the 
United States-Mexico border with high corn production); see also USDA FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., COMMODITY 
INTELLIGENCE REPORT (Aug. 12, 2012), available at http://www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/ 
2012/08/Mexico_corn/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing Mexican States with 
high corn production, including those along the border). 
21. Infra Part II. 
22. Infra Part II. 
23. Infra Part III. 
24. Infra Part IV. 
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II. MEXICO’S BAN ON GM MAIZE 
This section discusses the importance of maize to the Mexican culture and 
the interests involved in Mexico’s decision to limit the growth of GM maize. Part 
A delves into the history of maize in Mexico and Part B discusses the current 
conflict surrounding the ban on growing GM maize. 
A. A Culture of Corn 
Corn holds a unique place in Mexican culture.25 People in Mexico cultivated 
corn thousands of years ago from teosinte, a plant that still exists, but bears only 
a remote resemblance to the corn that is grown today.26 As the birthplace of 
maize, there are hundreds of unique landraces27 grown in Mexico.28 Generations 
of farmers have cultivated these landraces, and today, small and subsistence 
farmers grow them all over the country.29 The genetic diversity of maize grown in 
Mexico is immense, and this diversity is critical to maintain the world’s food 
sources.
30
 As agricultural crops become more homogenous, they become much 
more susceptible to pests and disease.31 
Mexico not only has an interest in preserving diversity, but also in 
maintaining its economy.32 Small and subsistence farmers throughout Mexico 
depend on their corn to survive.33 These farmers, or campesinos, live off of their 
crops and save seeds to plant year after year.34 This style of cultivation is very 
different from industrial cultivation, which uses commercial hybrid seed.35 This 
commercial seed has to be purchased anew each year because the seeds cannot be 
collected for replanting in the next year.36  
Mexico produces corn at all production levels, from campesino to industrial 
farmers.37 Corn accounts for more than half of the cultivated land in Mexico and 
“is the most important crop in Mexico in terms of area sown, production value, 
 
25. ANTAL ET AL., supra note 12, at 2. 
26. Turrent & Serratos, supra note 12. 
27. Landrace is defined as a traditional, open-pollination variety of a crop, here, corn. Kristin L. Mercer 
& Joel D. Wainwright, Gene Flow from Transgenic Maize to Landraces in Mexico: An Analysis, 123 AGRIC. 
ECOSYSTEM ENV’T 109 (2008). 
28. Turrent & Serratos, supra note 12, at 9. 
29. Stephen Brush & Michelle Chauvet, Assessment of Social and Cultural Effects Associated with 
Transgenic Maize Production, in MAIZE AND BIODIVERSITY: THE EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC MAIZE IN MEXICO 
7, 23 (2004). 
30. Murphy, supra note 4, at 95–97. 
31. Id. 
32. Turrent & Serratos, supra note 12. 
33. Brush & Chauvet, supra note 29, at 25. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 10. 
36. Id. at 10. 
37. Id. at 7. 
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and personnel employed.”38 For smaller producers, who account for sixty percent 
of Mexico’s maize producers, corn is more than a commodity; it is a keystone of 
the country’s culture.39 
B. The Mexican Ban on Transgenic Maize Cultivation 
In 1998, Mexico adopted a moratorium on growing GM corn.40 This was a 
result of many factors, one of which was the enforcement of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which went into effect in 1994.41 This 
agreement phased out import tariffs that had been in place for more than fifteen 
years and protected Mexican maize producers against competition from cheaper 
United States grain products.42 With NAFTA in place, Mexico quickly became a 
major export market for United States maize and by 2000 it had become the 
second most important market behind Japan.43 The United States does not 
separate transgenic corn from conventional corn during shipment, processing, 
milling, or packaging.44 “Thus, all exports of United States maize grain . . . are 
likely to contain or be derived partially from transgenic crops.”45 
With this influx of transgenic maize, meant only for consumption or animal 
feed, the Mexican government and scientists anticipated that some of these 
transgenic seeds would be planted. This was of concern because: 
[M]aize pollen carr[ies] transgenes over relatively long distances, [so] 
they knew that transgenic maize was likely to cross-pollinate with local 
varieties, transferring genetically engineered traits to those varieties. To 
prevent this, at least until its consequences were better understood, in 
1998 Mexican authorities placed a de facto moratorium on planting of 
transgenic maize.46 
This moratorium remained in effect until 2004,47 but it was not enough to 
stop transgenes from entering the maize population.48 In 2001, a University of 
California, Berkeley-based researcher found transgenes in the corn being grown 
 
38. Id. at 10. 
39. Id. at 25. 
40. Turrent & Serratos, supra note 12. 
41. McAfee, supra note 14, at 150–51. 
42. Id. at 150. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 151. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. ANTAL ET AL., supra note 12, at 20. 
48. Dr. Andrew W. Torrance, Planted Obsolescence: Synagriculture and the Law, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 321, 
325 (2012). 
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in Oaxaca.49 This discovery sparked controversy and a number of additional 
studies.50 Not all of these studies found transgenes, but each study used different 
sampling techniques, sample sizes, and sample fields, which contributed to the 
differing findings.51 The Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), 
established by the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation 
(NAAEC), 52 conducted an in-depth study of the effects of transgenic maize in 
Mexico and found that transgenes existed in the Mexican maize population and 
that it is probably impossible to completely remove them.53 
Finding transgenes in the native populations of maize did not end the 
moratorium; it stayed in place until 2004 when Mexico passed the Law on the 
Biosecurity of Genetically Modified Organisms.54 This law seeks to prevent, 
avoid, or reduce the risks that the release of GMOs into the Mexican market and 
environment might cause.55 The law lays out a procedure for the introduction of 
GMOs: all new transgenic crops must be evaluated and must be planted first in 
controlled plots to determine if it is safe to commercialize the product.56 
Despite the law’s attempt at comprehensive regulation of GMO introduction, 
critics state: 
[O]ne single law cannot at the same time promote a technology and 
establish mechanisms for biosecurity; the law provides for very little 
public participation . . . there are serious doubts as to the possibility of 
coexistence between GMOs and traditional organisms, especially in the 
case of corn, given open pollination; the burden of proof rests with the 
industry, which can not be both judge and interested party; the law does 
not include mechanisms for avoiding conflicts of interest . . . it does not 
respect the Cartagena Protocol because it fails to include compensation 
for harm caused and the establishment of funds for incidental expenses.57 
After the implementation of this law, three of the main agro-industrial firms 
with a presence in Mexico—Dow, Monsanto, and Pioneer—applied for approval 
 
49. Id. 
50. Mercer & Wainwright, supra note 27, at 110. 
51. Id. at 110–11. 
52. NAAEC is a multinational body formed as part of NAFTA, which addresses environmental concerns 
between Canada, the United States, and Mexico. 
53. Turrent & Serratos, supra note 12; McAfee, supra note 14, at 152. 
54. ANTAL ET AL., supra note 12, at 20; Ley sobre Bioseguridad de Organismos Genéticamente 
Modificados [LBOGM] [Law on Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms], Diario Oficial de la 
Federacion [DO], 2004, available at http://www.salud.gob.mx/unidades/cdi/nom/compi/ley180305.html (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
55. Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: Mexico, LIBR. OF CONG. (last visited Nov. 11, 2014) 
available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/mexico.php (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
56. Id.; ANTAL ET AL., supra note 12, at 21. 
57. ANTAL ET AL., supra note 12, at 22. 
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to plant transgenic maize.58 The Mexican government approved a number of these 
applications allowing experimentation with transgenic corn in the Mexican states 
of Sinaloa, Sonora, and Tamaulipas.59 However, these experiments were halted in 
October 2013 when a federal judge issued an injunction as part of an ongoing 
lawsuit.60 
This lawsuit was brought as a class action against the two Mexican 
governmental agencies charged with assessing and approving experimental 
planting of GMOs.61 A collection of citizens and organizations who wanted to 
protect the native landraces of maize from the possibility of cross-pollination by 
transgenic maize brought the case.62 They claimed, “transgenic maize threatens 
the biodiversity of traditional varieties grown by subsistence farmers and 
smallholders throughout Mexico.”63 Since the injunction, the court dismissed the 
lawsuit on other grounds including lack of standing on the part of the plaintiffs, 
but the plaintiffs have appealed and the fight in the courts over transgenic maize 
continues.64 
III. TRANSNATIONAL POLLUTION LAW AND THE SPREAD OF TRANSGENES 
Environmental pollution is not something that can be kept within a nation’s 
borders.65 One country’s water and air pollution inevitably travels to its 
neighbors, impacting those ecosystems and populations.66 Nations have addressed 
this issue in many ways such as creating treaties like the Cartagena Protocol and 
seeking arbitral decisions when disputes arise.67 These laws, treaties, and 
 
58. Id. at 17. 
59. Id. 
60. See Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: Mexico, supra note 55 (issuing an injunction 
stopping genetically modified corn from being released). 
61. Press Release, Semillas de Vida, Tribunal Federal Suspende Toda la Siembra de Maíz Transgénico 
(Oct. 10, 2013), available at http://www.semillasdevida.org.mx/index.php/documentos/articulos/93-boletines-
de-prensa/86-articulo-2-muestra (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
62. Id.; Laura Vargas-Parada, GM Maize Splits Mexico, 511 NATURE 16 (2014). 
63. Id. 
64. Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: Mexico, supra note 55; Vargas-Parada, supra note 
62. 
65. See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (Apr. 20) (finding 
the spread between Argentina and Uruguay was a consequence of the mill); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7 (Sept. 25) (arising from a dispute between Hungary and the 
Slovak Republic regarding the construction and operation of a system of locks impacting a transboundary 
river); Final Award, 20 Dec. 2013, Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pak. v. India), available at 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1392 (last visited Mar. 25, 2016) (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review). 
66. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 
Rep. 7; Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, supra note 65. 
67. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biodiversity, pmbl., Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 
1027 [hereinafter Cartagena Protocol]; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14; Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7; Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, supra note 65. 
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decisions have created a body of public international law that protects nations 
from the actions of their neighbors.68 Nations extend this body of law as they 
become more aware of the effects of pollution and such laws can be applied to 
the unwanted spread of transgenes across borders.69 
A. The Cartagena Protocol 
International agreements on biotechnology often cover only one of many 
concerns surrounding the creation, cultivation, and marketing to transgenic 
products.70 As of yet, there is no comprehensive international regulatory scheme 
for the development and introduction of biotechnology.71 The Cartagena Protocol 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity is one agreement that has sought to 
develop regulations concerning the transboundary movement of GMOs.72 This 
protocol focuses mostly on the intentional transfer of living modified organisms 
(LMOs) across national borders.73 It emphasizes and reinforces the precautionary 
principle, allowing parties to make decisions prohibiting the introduction of 
LMOs into their country even if there is a “[l]ack of scientific certainty due to 
insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of 
the potential adverse effects . . . on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity.”74 This attention to the possible damage that an LMO may 
cause to a nation’s ecosystem allows each party to make individualized decisions 
regarding the import of any LMO.75 
The Cartagena Protocol also addresses the social ramifications of importing 
LMOs.76 In making decisions on whether to allow the introduction of LMOs, a 
party may take into account “socio-economic considerations arising from the 
impact of living modified organisms on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity, especially with regard to the value of biological diversity to 
indigenous and local communities.”77 This consideration is especially important 
to Mexico because of the central role that maize has in its culture and economy.78 
 
68. See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (exemplifying conflicts between nations 
and the use of public international law as a remedy); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7; Indus 
Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, supra note 65; Cartagena Protocol, supra note 67, at 1027 (an international 
agreement establishing laws and standards addressing biodiversity issues). 
69. Infra Part III.C. 
70. Murphy, supra note 4, at 48. 
71. Id. 
72. Cartagena Protocol, supra note 67. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. See id. (examining damage and consequences to biosafety as they affect individual nations). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Supra Part II. 
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While this treaty, to which Mexico is a party but the United States is not, 
addresses some concerns surrounding transboundary movement of LMOs, it 
primarily focuses on intentional movement through trade from one party to 
another.79 Article 17 of the Cartagena Protocol addresses unintentional 
transboundary movements, but again, this Article is more concerned with 
unintentional movements facilitated by people, such as accidental transport.80 The 
Cartagena Protocol does not cover the spread of transgenes across borders 
through purely natural means, such as wind, nor does it address the liability 
stemming from such spread.81 There are, however, agreements and regulations in 
place regarding transboundary pollution more generally.82 
B. The Evolution of International Transboundary Pollution Law 
“[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the 
properties or persons therein.”83 Thus declared the tribunal in the 1941 Trail 
Smelter arbitration between Canada and the United States, establishing a 
foundational principle of modern international environmental law.84 A specially 
appointed arbitral panel held Canada liable for property damage in the United 
States caused by a smelting plant’s release of sulfur dioxide and established an 
operational regime for the prevention of future transboundary harm.85 
This decision rejected the notorious Harmon Doctrine of absolute territorial 
sovereignty.86 U.S. Attorney General Judson Harmon articulated this doctrine in 
1895 in response to a claim brought by Mexico against the United States.87 
Farmers along the Rio Grande in the United States were diverting large amounts 
of water for irrigation.88 According to Mexico, this caused a substantial decrease 
 
79. Cartagena Protocol, supra note 67. 
80. See id. (establishing notification protocol in the event one nation should become aware of 
unintentional transboundary movements of LMOs). 
81. Id. 
82. Alexandre Kiss & Dinah Shelton, Guide to International Environmental Law 89–109 (George 
Washington University Law School, Working Paper No. 347, 2007). 
83. Trail Smelter, (1949) 3 U.N.R.J.A.A. 1905 at p. 1965. 
84. Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Déjà Vu: Extraterritoriality, International Environmental Law, and 
the Search for Solutions to Canadian-U.S. Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 363, 364 
(2005). 
85. Id. at 365. 
86. Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried, Not Praised, 36 
NAT. RES. J. 965 (1996); see also Noah D. Hall, Transboundary Pollution: Harmonizing International and 
Domestic Law, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681, 693–94 (2007) (addressing pollution across nations and the use 
of international and domestic law). 
87. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo-International Law, 21 Op. Att’y Gen. 274 (1895) [hereinafter Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo]; see also McCaffrey, supra note 86, at 72 (commenting on the development of the Harmon 
Doctrine); Hall, supra note 86, at 693–94. 
88.  Hall, supra note 86, at 693–94. 
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in the downstream water supply.89 In response to Mexico’s formal complaint 
about this water diversion, Harmon stated, “[t]he fundamental principle of 
international law is the absolute sovereignty of every nation, as against all others, 
within its own territory.”90 This doctrine in essence would have legitimized 
activities within the United States causing transboundary harm through damage 
to natural resources.91 The doctrine has been largely discredited and was never 
actually applied to the Rio Grande water dispute.92 In fact, while this dogmatic 
stance would seem to benefit the United States against Mexico, if it were applied 
to the northern neighbor, Canada, it would operate to the disadvantage of the 
United States with respect to water such as the Columbia River that flows from 
Canada into the United States.93 Instead, the United States and Mexico resolved 
the dispute when they adopted a treaty that provided for the “equitable 
distribution of the waters of the Rio Grande.”94 
The Harmon doctrine came under heavy criticism, even by the United States, 
and from the outset was largely ignored.95 Instead, the Trail Smelter case became 
one of the most important cases in the development of international 
environmental law.96 It established the principle that not only does each sovereign 
have a responsibility to ensure that its territory is not used “in such a manner as 
to cause injury” or damage to the environment or people of another country, but 
also that there will be liability for the violation of this tenet.97 This case was the 
first international adjudicative decision that specifically addressed transboundary 
pollution,98 and a number of international instruments have reaffirmed its basic 
holding.99 
 
89.  Id. 
90. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 87, at 281–82. 
91. Hall, supra note 86, at 693–94. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Convention Providing for the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande for Irrigation 
Purposes, U.S.-Mex., May 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 2953. 
95.  McCaffrey, supra note 86; Hall, supra note 86, at 693–94. 
96. Kiss & Shelton, supra note 82, at 107. 
97. Trail Smelter, (1949) 3 U.N.R.J.A.A. 1905 at p. 1965. 
98. Subsequent international adjudicative decisions addressing transboundary pollution include: Pulp 
Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Reports 14 (Apr. 20); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Reports 7 (Sept. 25) (Final Award, Dec. 20, 2013), Indus Waters 
Kishenganga Arbitration, supra note 65. 
99. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 601(1) 
(1987) (incorporating the holding in Trail Smelter that a “state is obligated to take such measures as may be 
necessary, to the extent practicable under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or 
control . . . are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environment of another state or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”); United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil, June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26, 31 I.L.M. 874, 876 (June 14, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] (integrating Trail Smelter’s 
holding into an international environmental agreement); see also Hall, supra note 86, at 699 (noting 
international instruments reaffirming Trail Smelter’s holding). 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47 
311 
Many of the international conferences and agreements that propound the 
holding of Trail Smelter are considered “soft law” because they are nonbinding 
pronouncements of intent and thus do not have liability or remedies associated 
with them.100 However, soft law may still influence states’ behavior and often 
contributes to the development of binding customary international law.101 Three 
such instruments are the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States,102 the Stockholm Declaration, and the Rio Declaration.103 The 
Stockholm and Rio declarations were adopted at United Nations conferences on 
the environment in 1972 and 1992, respectively.104 The Convention on Biological 
Diversity adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio eventually spawned the Cartagena 
Protocol regulating the intentional transboundary movement of LMOs discussed 
above.105 
C. Applying Transboundary Pollution Principles to Transgenes 
The Trail Smelter case established more than a nation’s responsibility to use 
its own land in such a way so as to not harm neighboring countries, but also 
introduced the responsibility of a nation to control purely private conduct within 
its borders that might result in harmful transboundary consequences.106 This focus 
on controlling the actions of individuals within a nation means that each country 
has a duty to protect its neighbors from negative environmental impacts.107 
The Trail Smelter decision was limited to air pollution, specifically the 
spread of sulfur dioxide across the United States-Canada border. 108 But, since 
then, the general proposition has been applied to a variety of situations including 
environmental damage from nuclear fallout and water pollution.109 The 
 
100. EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 189–91 (1998). 
101. Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Common Law: The Soft Law of 
International Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 516, 517 (2008). 
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §601(1) 
(1987) (“A state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the extent practicable under the 
circumstances, to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control . . . are conducted so as not to cause 
significant injury to the environment of another state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”). 
103. See Rio Declaration, supra note 99; see also Dinah Shelton, Stockholm Declaration (1972) and Rio 
Declaration (1992), in Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2008). 
104. Id. 
105. Rio Declaration, supra note 99; Cartagena Protocol, supra note 67. 
106. ”[A] State owes . . . a duty to protect other States against injurious acts by individuals from within its 
jurisdiction.” Trail Smelter, (1949) 3 U.N.R.J.A.A. 1905 at p. 1963. 
107. See id. (Internal regulations and administrative bodies should ensure that any activity performed 
within a country’s borders does not have deleterious effect on the environment at large, not just within the 
country). 
108. Id. 
109. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8); Pulp 
Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Reports 14 (Apr. 20); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Reports 7 (Sept. 25) (Final Award, Dec. 20, 2013), Indus Waters 
Kishenganga Arbitration, supra note 65. 
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International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons permanently established the Trail Smelter concept in 
international environmental law and stated that “[t]he existence of the general 
obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control 
respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is 
now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment.”110 A 
number of international decisions have cited this statement with approval.111 
By expanding the holding of Trail Smelter to more than just air pollution, 
international tribunals have resolved disputes between countries that arise from 
threats to the environment.112 For example, a dispute arose between Argentina and 
Uruguay when Uruguay approved the construction of two pulp mills on the river 
that delineates the border between the two nations.113 Uruguay’s decision 
allegedly threatened the ecosystem and violated a treaty of mutual use and 
protection of the river and its ecosystem.114 During its discussion of Argentina’s 
allegations, the International Court of Justice considered the environmental effect 
that the mills’ construction on the Uruguay side of the river might have on 
Argentina’s environment.115 The court reiterated the prevention principles of Trail 
Smelter as well as in a subsequent decision, the Coruf Channel case,116 stating 
that “a State is thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid 
activities which take place in its territory . . . causing significant damage to the 
environment of another State.”117 While the court did not ultimately find 
significant environmental damage, it did find procedural breaches of a treaty 
between Uruguay and Argentina that required each country to inform the other of 
any construction on the river.118 The court found that Uruguay failed to properly 
inform Argentina of the mill projects.119 Throughout the decision, the court 
emphasized that all nations must practice due diligence to ensure conduct within 
the boundaries of one nation do not negatively impact the environments of other 
 
110. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,1996 I.C.J. 226, supra note 109. 
111. E.g., Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (basing a portion of analysis on this 
proposition); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7 (citing this proposition to emphasize the need 
to “look afresh at the effects on the environment”); Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, supra note 65 
(applying this international law). 
112. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 
Rep. 7; Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, supra note 65. 
113. Only one of these mills was actually constructed and put into operation. Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay, 2010 I.C.J. Reports 14. 
114. Statute of the River Uruguay, Uru.-Arg., Feb. 26, 1975, UNTS, Vol. 635, No. 9074, p. 98. 
115. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 2010 I.C.J. Reports 14. 
116. Trail Smelter, (1949) 3 U.N.R.J.A.A. 1905; see also The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 
I.C.J. Rep. at 22 (holding in the same decade as Trail Smelter that it is “every State’s obligation not to allow 
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States”). 
117. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 2010 I.C.J. Reports 14. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
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nations.120 The court went so far as to require Uruguay to continuously monitor 
the impacts of the pulp mills to prevent such negative effects.121 
Like the pulp mills in Uruguay, the spread of transgenes from crops planted 
in the United States near Mexico could have a significant negative effect both on 
Mexico’s environment and economy.122 Under the public international law 
concepts established by Trail Smelter and subsequent cases, the United States has 
a responsibility to its neighbors to ensure that industries and practices inside the 
country do not have negative transboundary effects.123 This responsibility should 
extend to ensuring that transgenes do not propagate in the crops of a neighboring 
country, especially if that country, like Mexico, has a specific ban on the growth 
of GMO plants.124 Establishing this extension might require Mexico to show 
damage or threat of damage from contamination.125 Given the importance of corn 
to Mexico’s national identity and economy, proving damage would be only a 
small hurdle.126 
Furthermore, while the damage in Trail Smelter was based on physical 
damage inflicted on crops and trees,127 society’s current view on the environment 
has made damage to the environment itself, even without economic damage, a 
matter of international concern.128 In Gab íkovo-Nagymaros Project, the 
International Court of Justice emphasized that the protection of the environment 
is an “essential interest” of all nations.129 The court stressed the importance of the 
environment, not only for individual nations but also for the whole of 
humankind.130 Quoting from its opinion in Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
the Court stated: 
[T]he environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, 
the quality of life, and the very health of human beings, including 
generations unborn. The existence of the general obligation of States to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the 
 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Supra Part II. 
123. See Trail Smelter, 3 U.N.R.J.A.A. 1905 (requiring nations to ensure activity within a nation’s 
borders to not negatively impact the environment of other nations). 
124. See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Reports 7 (Sept. 25) 
(stating “in the field of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often 
irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of 
reparation of this type of damage”); Brush & Chauvet, supra note 29, at 5 (noting the importance of maize to 
Mexico’s economy and environment). 
125. See Trail Smelter, 3 U.N.R.J.A.A. 1905 (liability and harm was based on economic damage to farms 
and timber forests). 
126. See supra Part II (detailing the importance of maize to Mexico). 
127. Trail Smelter, 3 U.N.R.J.A.A. 1905. 
128. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. Reports at 41. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
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environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now 
part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment.131 
This new focus on environmental protection extends to protecting the genetic 
makeup and diversity of the environment.132 Allowing the homogenization of 
corn DNA in the birthplace of corn arguably has a negative effect on our 
environment that is far greater than transboundary pollution from a paper mill or 
smelting plant.133 
The Pulp Mills case went a step further than Trail Smelter holding, “[a] State 
is thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities 
which take place in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing 
significant damage to the environment of another State.”134 This sets out a high 
burden for countries. While the United States does have some regulations and 
regulatory bodies in place that control the creation, production, and growth of 
GM plants, they are fairly lax; also, the United States operates under a permissive 
system to promote the GM market.135 
D. The Political Harm Theory 
The United States has a responsibility not to “use or permit the use of its 
territory in such a manner as to cause injury” to another state not only 
environmentally, but also politically.136 One critic of United States’ GMO policy, 
Alison Peck, argues that the United States’ minimal regulations and politically 
motivated desire to trade GM products imposes on other nations’ political rights 
to determine how they accept or reject GM products.137 GMOs cannot be 
contained, and most countries must deal with the adventitious presence of 
transgenes or “the unintentional and incidental commingling of trace amounts of 
one type of seed, grain or food product with another.”138 Because trace amounts 
of transgenic products and seed cross borders, countries like Mexico must then 
 
131. Id. (quoting Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 
p. 242, para. 29 (July 8)). 
132. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 242, 
para. 29. (July 8) (reasoning there are elements that should be taken into account when implementing new rules 
and laws). 
133. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 95–97 (describing the dangers of decreasing crop genetic diversity that 
may arise from GM crops); Nancy Ehrenreich & Beth Lyon, The Global Politics of Food: A Critical Overview, 
43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 12 (2011) (discussing the dangers presented to Mexican farmers by decreased genetic 
diversity of maize). 
134. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg.v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Reports 14 (Apr. 20) at 56 
(emphasis added). 
135. Infra Part IV. 
136. Alison Peck, The New Imperialism: Toward an Advocacy Strategy for GMO Accountability, 21 GEO. 
INT’L ENVT’L L. REV. 37 (2008). 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 38. 
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struggle with how to contain the contamination. The country’s political right to 
determine whether to accept GM products is eviscerated and, instead, the country 
must find ways to handle the unwanted GM products that have inadvertently 
entered the country.139 This diminishes a country’s sovereignty over food crops 
and its ability to make cultural decisions.140 
Peck argues that framing the harm caused by the spread of GMOs as political 
gives nations that follow the precautionary principle a stronger argument against 
the United States’ policies that promote the proliferation of GMOs in the 
international market.141 This is because the harm experienced politically is real 
and undeniable.142 For example, Brazil found trace amounts of GMOs in its crops 
and had to struggle with how to incorporate, contain, or control the spread of the 
modified genes.143 Today, Brazil grows modified soybean, maize, and cotton, but 
the adventitious presences of GM crops that the government had not approved for 
any purpose took the decision out of Brazil’s control.144 
This quantifiable and tangible harm could be a better tool to promote the 
precautionary principle than environmental harm.145 Nations that fear the damage 
GMOs might cause face the issue that scientific evidence of these dangers does 
not currently exist and likely cannot, unless contamination in fact occurs.146 
Mexico has built a sense of identity and a culture around corn.147 It is of 
utmost importance to many small farmers who have cultivated heirloom varieties 
that they be able to protect their heritage.148 That protection hinges on Mexico’s 
ability to ban the growth of GM maize and shield landraces from pollen drift and 
fertilization by GM pollen.149 
The United States’ importation of GM corn into Mexico for use as feed and 
food threatens Mexico’s ability to enforce a ban on the growth of GM maize.150 
Because the United States exports a significant amount of corn to Mexico and 
because the United States does not separate GM and non-GM seeds before 
export, it is impossible for the Mexican government to ensure that none of the 
GM seeds are planted, introducing transgenes into the native populations.151 This 
 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Turrent & Serratos, supra note 12. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. McAfee, supra note 14, at 150. 
151. See Brush & Michelle Chauvet, supra note 29, at 25 (discussing the difficulties of ensuring that GM 
corn is not planted in Mexico under NAFTA); McAfee, supra note 14, at 150–51 (describing the difficulty of 
restricting GM maize growth in Mexico under NAFTA). 
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leads to the irreversible presence of transgenes in the population and strips 
Mexico of its power to determine whether to accept transgenic corn and its 
ability to protect the genetic identity and quality of its native corn.152 The 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s report on the effects of transgenic 
maize in Mexico determined that Mexico had good reason to prohibit the growth 
of GM maize and, in order to accomplish this, corn imported from the United 
States should be milled to ensure that GM seeds could not be inadvertently 
planted.153 If Mexico required imported corn to be milled, it would add a 
significant cost, but might allow Mexico to reclaim some of its political power to 
define its relationship with biotechnology and GM maize.154 
IV. MINIMIZING LIABILITY AND REGULATING THE TRANSNATIONAL SPREAD OF 
TRANSGENES 
A. Regulations and Regulatory Bodies in the United States 
In the United States, three agencies have been charged with ensuring the 
safety of GMOs.155 The Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) is tasked 
with ensuring GMOs are safe for the environment; the United States Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for ensuring that they are safe to grow; and 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ensures that food and consumable 
products made from GMOs are safe for human ingestion.156 Despite the 
involvement of three government agencies, production of transgenic crops in the 
United States is minimally regulated.157 Once a product is approved for growth, 
farmers can plant with very little oversight.158 This is in part because, from the 
outset of American GMO regulation in 1987, such regulations have been shaped 
by viewing GMOs as product-based, presuming a low risk from genetic 
modification, and a desire to “review GM products under existing federal” 
 
152. See COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, MAIZE & BIODIVERSITY, THE EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC 
MAIZE IN MEXICO; KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25 (2004) (stating that Mexico cannot successfully 
keep modified genes out of its maize population if GM maize is imported) 
153. See id. at 27 (noting that if all imported GM maize was milled, there would be no danger of modified 
genes entering the population). 
154. See id. (stating that milling GM corn would reduce the chances of modified genes being introduced 
into the population). 
155. Elizabeth G. Hill, Comment, Nature’s Harvest or Man’s Profit: Environmental Shortcuts in the 
Deregulation of Genetically Modified Crops, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 353, 366 (2012). 
156. Id. 
157. Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically Modified Food and 
Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 734 (2003). 
158. Id. at 733. 
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statutes.159 This Comment argues that the EPA and the USDA are best positioned 
to address the spread of transgenes across the United States-Mexico border.160 
1. The EPA 
When the regulatory framework was established in the mid-1980s, the EPA 
was only charged with applying existing pesticide laws to GM plants that 
produced a pesticide.161 The focus in the EPA, like the USDA and FDA, was on 
the end product—the pesticide produced—not on the plant itself or the effects of 
genetic drift on other life forms.162 Under existing law, the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 
the EPA can assess the pesticides produced in plants and assign “tolerances” to 
these pesticides.163 A tolerance is the permissible amount of pesticide residue in 
food items such that there is “reason[able] certainty that no harm will result” 
from consumption over a person’s lifetime.164 This narrow scope of regulation 
came under fire in 1999 when a study showed that corn pollen from Bt corn165 
was dusting milkweed plants and killing monarch butterfly caterpillars.166 This 
deleterious effect on a non-target species called into question the EPA’s policy to 
only look at the end product effect of plant-pesticides and not the overall effect 
on the environment.167 
The EPA’s strategy was again called into question by the Starlink crisis.168 
Starlink, a genetically modified corn hybrid, produces a plant-pesticide protein, 
Cry9C, much like Bt corn.169 The Cry9C protein, however, was not given full 
approval for use in food.170 Instead it was given “split registration,” which 
allowed the growth of Starlink corn, but limited its use to animal feed.171 The 
 
159. Id. 
160. Unlike the USDA and EPA, the FDA does not deal with issues of crop production, but rather with 
the sale of end product food. As such, the FDA is not poised to address the spread of transgenes because it 
focuses on the use of GMOs after they are harvested, not when they are planted and grown. However, because 
this is a matter that affects foreign countries it is likely that the State Department also has a part to play in 
developing policies regarding the transboundary spread of GMOs. 
161. Marden, supra note 157, at 743. 
162. 40 C.F.R. § 152.3 (2003). 
163. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 346(a) (2000). 
164. 21 U.S.C. § 346(c)(2) (2000). 
165. Bt corn is a genetically modified strain of corn that produces a toxin commonly produced by a soil 
bacterium, Bacillus thuringiensis, which kills pests such as the corn borer. Ric Bessin, Bt-Corn: What it is and 
How it Works, COLLEGE OF AGRIC., FOOD AND ENV’T, UNIV. OF KY. (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www2.ca.uky.edu/ 
entomology/entfacts/ef130.asp (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Bt tends to affect larvae 
or caterpillars which otherwise would eat the corn. Id. 
166. John E. Losey et al., Transgenic Pollen Harms Monarch Larvae, 399 NATURE 214 (1999). 
167. Marden, supra note 157, at 780. 
168. Id. at 781–83. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
2016 / Transgenic Transboundary Pollution 
318 
concern was that the Cry9C protein might cause allergies if ingested by humans 
because the protein could survive cooking and was difficult to digest.172 An 
independent testing laboratory discovered Cry9C contamination in Taco Bell 
taco shells.173 This discovery showed that the EPA regulations and planting 
instructions were not effective and that transgenic plant products not approved 
for human consumption had entered the food chain.174 While there were 
specifications for farmers growing Starlink, either the specifications were 
ineffective in and of themselves, or the farmers were not implementing them.175 
This allowed transgenes to contaminate conventional crops, a contamination that 
some thought was “inevitable given the lack of enforcement capacity of the 
EPA.”176 
Despite rising concerns about the environmental impact transgenic plants 
could have, the EPA has not changed its approach to regulating the production of 
such plants.177 The EPA continues to focus on the risks of any pesticides 
genetically modified plants produce, not on the plants or genes themselves.178 The 
EPA should have a more significant role in evaluating the impacts to the genetic 
diversity of food crops and the environment at large.179 Without genetic diversity, 
ecosystems and farm crops become much more susceptible to diseases and 
pests.180 In order for the United States to limit liability for damage caused by its 
transgenes in other countries, it must have a clear policy and procedure for 
introducing new GM plants into the environment and controlling the inevitable 
natural dissemination of transgenes into plant genomes.181 The EPA should focus 
its regulations not only on the effects of the pesticides produced by GMOs, but 
also on the plants themselves and the holistic effect they have on the greater 
environment.182 This more holistic view would increase the ability to control the 
dispersal of modified genes.183 
 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
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180. While transgenic techniques can be used to make crops more resistant to particular environmental 
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This is especially the case when considering transgenic corn and its impact 
on Mexico.184 The United States is the largest developer of biotechnology,185 and 
as such, most new GM plants are developed with the U.S. ecosystem and farming 
systems in mind.186 Additionally, not many food crops originate in the United 
States, and, as a result, there are few wild species that could crossbreed with GM 
crops.187 However, that is not the case in Mexico.188 As the birthplace of corn, it 
contains a huge diversity of genetics, a diversity that must be preserved.189 The 
effect of a transgene contaminating plants in Mexico would likely have a much 
larger effect than in the United States.190 This disparate impact is one of the many 
areas in which the EPA should have a larger role to discover and regulate.191 
2. The USDA 
At the outset of GM regulation, the USDA took the most cautious stance 
towards new genetically modified crops.192 Unlike the FDA and EPA, the USDA 
did not presume that existing regulations would be sufficiently broad to cover 
GMOs.193 Instead, it created rules and regulations specific to the “importation, 
interstate movement, or release into the environment” of new genetically 
modified crops.194 By defining new GM plants as “plant pests,” the USDA had 
the power to take remedial measures, including seizure, quarantine, or 
destruction of new GM crops per the Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA).195 Under the 
FPPA, the USDA required anyone who wanted to plant a new GMO to get a 
permit.196 As the USDA gained experience with GMOs and experienced political 
pressure from GMO developers, it modified its regulations to be more in line 
with the policy of minimal regulation.197 
 
184. See supra Part II (discussing the impact transgenic maize would have on Mexico). 
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186. NAT’L RES. COUNS., FIELD TESTING GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: FRAMEWORK FOR 
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194. Introduction of Organisms and Products Altered or Produced Through Genetic Engineering Which 
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197. Marden, supra note 157. 
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Over the next decade, the USDA became more lax with its regulations as it 
began granting some crops, including corn, non-regulated status.198 Upon petition 
to the USDA, non-regulated status may be granted to those GM products that do 
not pose a “greater plant pest risk than the unmodified organism from which it 
derived.”199 In 1997, the USDA expanded its non-regulated status to any modified 
organism “closely related” to a GM plant that had been granted non-regulated 
status.200 Thus, after the USDA approves one plant through the petition process, 
all a party with a new GM plant has to do is certify that it is “closely related” to 
the approved plant and the new GM plant will be exempt from regulation.201 
While the USDA has stepped back from its once precautionary view of 
GMOs, it still might be poised to address concerns of the transboundary spread of 
transgenes.202 As the agency that regulates agriculture, it could adopt regulations 
that would decrease any chance of unwanted genes from crossing into Mexico.203 
Creating a buffer of a few miles between any GM cornfields and the border 
would decrease any chance of cross-pollination.204 This could be important in 
regards to corn with genetics to produce biopharmaceuticals or industrial 
compounds, the next step in bioengineered plants.205 
B. The Judiciary’s Role in Limiting Potential Liability 
As genetically modified crops become increasingly common in the United 
States, transboundary pollination becomes more likely.206 Should this happen, 
under Trail Smelter, the United States is liable for any damage the spread of 
transgenes might cause.207 The United States might counter this liability if it 
reassesses its focus on the production and sale of new GM technologies.208 As 
discussed above, the U.S. regulatory policy on genetic modification has focused 
on the end product, not the recombined genes themselves.209 The U.S. regulatory 
scheme assumes that transgenes are not a threat to the environment because they 
 
198. Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products; Notification Procedures for the Introduction of 
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209. Id. 
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are made up of the same components as naturally occurring genes.210 This limited 
view may subject the United States to liability for any international 
environmental damage resulting from the transboundary migration of transgenic 
pollen.211 Evidence suggests that this relaxed view about the spread of transgenes 
might be changing.212 
In 2005, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)—the 
USDA branch that makes regulatory decisions about transgenic crops—approved 
a new Roundup Ready alfalfa for deregulation.213 In order to deregulate a new 
crop, APHIS must complete an environmental assessment to determine if the new 
crop will significantly affect the environment.214 If, during the environmental 
assessment process, substantial questions are raised as to the effect a new GM 
crop might have on the environment, APHIS must prepare an environmental 
impact statement to answer these questions before deregulating the crop.215 
APHIS prepared an environmental assessment and made the application public 
for comments before approving the alfalfa.216 APHIS ultimately found no 
significant impact.217 This finding allowed APHIS to forego preparing an 
environmental impact statement.218 APHIS came to this conclusion despite the 
fact that 520 of the 663 comments submitted to APHIS opposed deregulation.219 
The concerns raised included probable contamination of non-GM fields with 
the transgene, the impact such contamination might have on organic farmers, and 
a possible increase in Roundup-resistant weeds caused by increased use of the 
herbicide.220 The environmental assessment disregarded these concerns and a 
group of farmers challenged the APHIS decision to deregulate without an 
environmental impact statement.221 
The case was taken before the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California.222 The question of whether the introduction of a GM crop 
might contaminate non-GM fields, thus diminishing or eliminating the 
availability of non-GM varieties, is a significant environmental impact requiring 
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the preparation of an environmental impact statement was one of first 
impression.223 The judge decided that such a threat to the environment, and by 
extension the value of farmers’ crops and their personal choice of whether to 
grow GM plants, was significant enough to require a thorough investigation.224 In 
doing so, the court rejected a number of the government’s arguments, including 
that the justification of the possible evolution of more herbicide resistant weeds 
was not a significant impact on the environment because weed species often 
develop such resistances.225 The court stated that such logic was “tantamount to 
concluding that because this environmental impact has occurred in other contexts 
it cannot be significant.”226 
The court also questioned the product-only focus of APHIS and its 
assumption that a recombined gene itself is not a threat to the environment.227 It 
stated that “[a]n action which potentially eliminates or least [sic] greatly reduces 
the availability of a particular plant—here, non-engineered alfalfa—has a 
significant effect on the human environment.”228 This indicates that the spread of 
the transgene impacts the environment, and as such APHIS must first determine 
the extent of this impact before allowing commercial production.229 Moreover, the 
court noted that as “APHIS is operating in uncharted territory,” it is not enough 
to rely on a record of potential spread, but new studies must be conducted.230 
While the full impact of this case on the USDA’s and EPA’s practices is yet 
to be seen,231 if this more cautious approach to releasing new GM plants into the 
environment is followed, the United States might be able to better limit its 
liability for any transboundary harm such crops might have.232 Taking a more 
careful look at the possible spread of transgenes and using this information to 
regulate the planting and dissemination of such genes would go far to addressing 
the liability that transboundary pollution law could impose.233 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The spread of genetically modified plants is a global environmental issue.234 
Keeping transgenes within a nation’s borders is impossible;235 they spread not 
only through trade of foodstuffs, but also through natural means like the dispersal 
of pollen by wind and insects.236 Because of this, nations leading GM crop 
development must be thorough in their assessments of the environmental impacts 
of those crops.237 Moreover, these nations need to ensure that their policies and 
use of GM crops do not harm their neighbors environmentally, culturally, 
politically, or economically.238 Transboundary pollution law principles are 
applicable to the spread of transgenes and it follows that each nation must ensure 
that no activities involving GM crops occurring within its borders negatively 
affect its neighbors.239 
As the leader in the development of new biotechnologies and transgenic 
crops, the United States holds the unique position of being the first to study and 
determine the risks of allowing a new transgenic crop to be planted.240 As of now, 
the United States has some of the world’s lowest standards for allowing new GM 
crops into the market.241 Because of international trade regulations, other 
countries that are more wary of transgenic crops have been required to lower 
their own standards and accept the import of GM products.242 This allows the 
United States to set the bar on how in-depth a new GM crop and its effects on the 
environment must be examined before being commercialized.243 However, if such 
a new product does have a deleterious effect on the environment of the United 
States or a neighbor, such as Mexico, then the principles put forth in Trail 
Smelter and its progeny provide a basis for liability.244 
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